Using semi-annual earnings announcement data in New Zealand from 1998 to 2014, we find evidence of significant pre-announcement price run-ups prior to "good news" announcements, which is a prima facie evidence of abnormal trading. We then investigate the effectiveness of changing regulations. Our results suggest that tightening disclosure requirements and using a centralised regulatory authority successfully reduced abnormal trading activity, however switching insider trading from a civil to a criminal offence increased such activity, likely due to the increased burden of proof needed in prosecution. Further analysis using high frequency data also supports this finding. These findings have meaningful policy implications and raise important questions on financial markets regulation.
Introduction
The regulation of financial markets has been in the public eye in recent times. Hirshleifer (2008) argues that changes in financial regulation are often due to political and social pressures, not economic effectiveness. This raises a question about the effectiveness of laws to reduce the insider trading. Most paper failed to find evidence that regulations help, having weak preventative effect at best (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Walker and Simpson, 2013 ).
Insider trading is one aspect of financial market regulation which governments have looked to target. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) These changes make New Zealand a good place to test the impact of financial market regulations on market trading. The punishment from criminal sanctions is more severe if caught, however the burden of proof is higher for criminal offences than civil, with prosecutors having to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt as opposed to on the balance of probabilities.
This increased burden of proof is even more of an issue having regard to the fact that no insider trading case has ever lead to conviction within New Zealand, due to the difficulty of proving the offence.
1 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) also found that having laws which are unlikely to be enforced can actually have a detrimental effect overall.
Investigating the presence and performance of illegal insider trading is a difficult task, due to the intentionally hidden nature of such activity and the requirement of trading account data. Therefore, we look for alternative ways by identifying the existence of abnormal trading in the New Zealand market, which has been used in many studies such as Keown and Pinkerton (1981) , Ball and Kothari (1991) , Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Meulbroek (1992) . Keown, Pinkerton, Young and Hansen (1985) compare the price run-ups prior to a merger announcement in a successfully prosecuted case by the SEC to a comparable sample of merger target firms' price run-ups prior to public announcement, and found that the runups were not statistically different. This reinforces the conclusion that a key component of abnormal trading activity prior to announcements is insider trading. Ball and Kothari (1991) extended analysis on abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements by controlling for the fact that return variances and betas increase during announcement periods, thus increasing expected returns. They find that abnormal returns remain even after controlling for this. They also investigated whether cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns over the announcement period is a function of firrm size. They report that abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements of smaller firms are higher than for larger firms, due to smaller firms releasing relatively more information through earnings announcements.
In summary, if there exists insider trading, then we should be able to observe the abnormal trading around corporate announcement. If the law changes affect the illegal insider trading, then the abnormal trading under different law regimes will be different. The magnitude of abnormal trading will decrease if the law is effective in regulating those behaviors.
This study uses semi-annual earnings announcements to investigate the presence of abnormal trading activity in the New Zealand market. Looking at companies on the NZX All settlements, e.g., Kerry Hoggard, Chairman of Fletcher Challenge at the time, settled out-of-court a dispute related to his heavy purchases prior to a restructuring announcement.
Index during the period January 1998 -March 2014, we identify the existence of significant abnormal price run-ups in the 7 days prior to "good news" announcements, resulting in average pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 0.58%. We use this as evidence of the market reacting to the presence of abnormal trading activity based on non-public information. These traders are able to earn an average abnormal return of 1.59%
in the window 7 days before to 7 days after earnings announcements.
We extend the analysis to look at the effectiveness of two legislative changes on the insider trading regime within New Zealand during the period, and whether they have successfully reduced abnormal trading prior to earnings announcements. Our findings suggest that the first legislative change, which created a centralised investments regulator and increased disclosure requirements, was successful in reducing abnormal trading activity. However the second legislative change in the period, which changed insider trading from a civil to a criminal offense, appears to have had a detrimental effect on the market by increasing the burden of proof required to prove insider trading. We then employ the volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) to examine the change of informed trading probability before the announcement date. We find that consistent with the results of CAR, there is an increase of probability of informed trading between 7-5 days before and 4-1 day before the announcement. The increase of VPIN after the second legislative change is more significant than between the first and second legislative change. We also look at the effect liquidity has on abnormal trading activity, finding that abnormal trading activity appears to be more significant for illiquid firms. Finally, we investigate whether there is any significant crossindustry variation, and identify that abnormal trading activity appears to be more prevalent within certain industries, particularly the Goods industry.
The relevant studies using New Zealand data are Tourani-Rad (2008, 2013 ).
2 They investigate the impact of two legislatve changes on the aggregate market quality. They employed Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) model to decompose the bid-ask spread into an information asymmetry component, which represents the risk premium liquidity providers demand as a result of trading with potentially better informed investors. Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) found that, comparing an 18 month window either side of the first legislative change, the bid-ask ask spread, and specifically the information asymmetry component, decreased. This decrease in bid-ask spread signals that the cost of trading had decreased and market makers perceived there to be less informed investors.
Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2013), however, found that in the 12 month window either side of the second regulatory change, the bid-ask spread and information asymmetry worsened, indicating the change lead to a decrease in market quality. This paper is different from theirs on research question and empirical methodology. We focus on the abnormal trading arround earnings announcments, while they examine the impact on the aggregate market quality. Using the particular earning announcement event enables us to better control the impact of other factors on the aggregate market, and provide a direct test about financial market regulation and possible insider trading around earnings announcements. We also use a different approach to estimate the information asymmetry level. We empoly a volumesynchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) measure recently proposed by Easley, 2 In a similar study, Duncan and Etebari (1990) investigated information leakage and pre-announcement price run-ups for all types of corporate announcements in the New Zealand market. They also found strong evidence of pre-announcement price run-ups and trade volume changes in the New Zealand market, concluding that abnormal trading activity prior to corporate announcements was present during their sample period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology for the even study. Section 3 discusses data and presents empirical results. Section 4 provides other extension tests. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
The legislative background and methodology
In this section, we present first the legislative background in New Zealand, the event study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997) , then volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) measure proposed by Easley et al. (2012) .
Legislative change about insider trading in New Zealand
The first major attempt at statutory control over insider trading in New Zealand was made in 1988 with the enactment of the Securities Markets Act.
3 The general consensus on New Zealand's insider trading regime is that it has failed (Walker and Simpson, 2013) , 
Event study
To look for pre-announcement price run-ups, the event study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997) is employed. For each of the earning announcements, we look at the period 7 days before until 7 days after the announcement. The share price data was first used to calculate daily returns for each day t in the event window, for each earnings announcement event j, using the formula:
We then adjust these daily stock returns to find the abnormal returns, first using the standard market model to get the expected returns,R j,t , as outlined by MacKinlay (1997) , where the β j and α j for each event was estimated using data on that company 2 years prior to the event window beginning 4 :R
The abnormal return (AR) is then given by subtracting the expected returns from the actual observed return, R j,t :
The abnormal returns are accumulated for each day of the event period, t, to find the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each announcement:
We then average the invididual CAR across all announcements to find the mean CAR of the sample:
A t-statistic is then calculated for each day of the event window. If the CAR t is positive in the days leading up to good news announcements and negative for bad news announcements, this is evidence of abnormal trading activity.
5 If the earnings per share (EPS) announced by a company beats the market's expected EPS, it will be regarded as good news, and if it is below the market's expectation it will be regarded as bad news. Financial analysts'
forecasted EPS is typically used as a proxy for the market's expectation, however there 4 We also use the constant return model and market adjusted return model to calculate the abnormal return. The results are very close to those using market model. 5 We use one-sided test since the reseach hypothesis not only predicts that the CAR t is different from zero, but that it would be different in a specific direction.
are too few financial analysts in New Zealand to provide accurate EPS forecasts for each company. With such data unavailable, we have used a different method to come up with a proxy for good news and bad news announcements by looking at the change in earnings from one period to the next. We first calculated the earnings change for each announcement as:
We then adjust for market wide changes on a year-by-year basis to account for business cycle effects, such as the Global Financial Crisis. This was done by first finding the average change in earnings for each year across all companies in the sample, Earnings change year , and using this as our proxy for market-wide earnings change. These are then subtracted from each corresponding Earningschange j to give an abnormal change in earnings for each announcement:
Abnormal earnings change j = Earnings change j − Earnings change year .
Each event is then split into quintiles based on abnormal earnings changes for that year, with the top quintile representing the largest abnormal earnings changes and thus used as our proxy for good news, and the bottom quintile representing bad news announcements.
Volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN)
Among the literature of market microstructure, there are many methods that could be used to exract the component of informed trading in high frequency data, for example Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Easley, Kiefe, O'Hara and Paperman (1996) .
However, these models generally require the estimation of unobservable parameters and might have convergence problems if the market is illiquid and the number of transaction is limited. Recently, Easley et al. (2012) proposed a volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) to overcome this by calculating the probability of informed trading directly from the trasaction data. It does not require the intermediate numerical estimation
of non-observable parameters. We shall use the VPIN measure in the empirical analysis and explain it in the following.
Firstly, for each earning announcment event j, we calculate the buy and sell volume (V B j,t and V S j,t ) using one-hour time bars at day t, i.e.,
where i is the index of ith-hour in day t, V i is the trading volume of the ith-hour, Z(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and σ ∆P j is the estimate of standard deviation of price changes between time bars. Following Easley et al. (2012) , the VPIN of day t is approxiamted by
We average the individual V P IN j,t across all announcements to find the mean VPIN of the sample:
In the empirical study, we calculate the daily VPIN of each event from seven days to one day before the earning annoucement, and compare the change of VPIN between [−7, −5] and [−4, −1] windows. If the abnormal trading one week prior is partly due to the informed trading, we will observe the change of VPIN during these two time windows.
3 Empirical results
Data
To construct the sample of companies, we first manually collected semi-annual earnings data from January 1998 to March 2014 for 111 companies listed on the NZX All index via the NZX Company Research historical announcements database. Ideally, quarterly earnings data would have been collected to give more data points, but very few New Zealand companies release quarterly earnings information. Semi-annual data was used as the best alternative. The data collected was earnings per share (EPS) and the date used was the date the information was announced to the public. January 1998 was used as the start point to ensure the sample had enough data to analyse the effect of the first legislative change in
2002.
Daily share price (at close), bid and ask prices, volumes traded and market capitalisation data were then collected from the Sirca Portal and Thomson Reuters Tick History for these 111 companies over the sample period. Daily share price data was missing for a few small sections, and in this case we use the share price at the last available data point. The companies had to be listed at March 2014 to be included, so had to either last the whole period or become listed during the period -those that delisted during the period are not included.
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The NZX All Index daily values were collected from the NZX Company Research historical database, and are used as a proxy for market return. Table 1 [Insert Table 1 here]
Using Eq. (7), each event is split into quintiles based on abnormal earnings changes for that year, with the top quintile representing the largest abnormal earnings changes and thus used as our proxy for "good news", and the bottom quintile representing "bad news"
announcements. Table 2 [Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 reports the average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each day during the 15 day announcement period for both the "good news" and "bad news" announcements.
Empirical results

CAR results of full sample
First we assess the effectiveness of our "good news" and "bad news" proxies by looking at the CAR t across the entire event window. We observe a CAR +7 of -0.57%, significant at the 10% level, for our "bad news" sample, and a 1.59% CAR +7 , significant at the 1% level, for our "good news" sample. These results indicate that our proxies are applicable, with the market reacting in the way we would expect following such announcements.
We now look for the presence of price run-ups (run-downs) prior to the announcement of good (bad) news, which is evidence of abnormal trading. We observe significant difference between the market's reaction to good and bad news announcements. Prior to announcements considered to be good news by the market, we observe a CAR −1 of 0.58%, significant at the 1% level. Such a pattern is what we would expect to see if inside information had been traded on prior to the good announcement, with the market recognising an increased demand for shares and increasing the price accordingly. The results also show that insiders buying stock 7 days before a good announcement can make an abnormal return of 1.59% on average over the 15 day window (almost 40% annualised), which is economically significant.
Prior to bad announcements, however, we do not find any evidence of information leakage, with a negligible CAR −1 found. This can be explained by the lack of short-selling in the New Zealand market (Fabozzi and Asness, 2004 ) with short-selling only becoming possible for the average private investor after 2006 (Wiggs, 2007) , and the depth of the short-selling market still severely lacking today.
[Insert Table 3 here] Figure 1 depicts the CAR t for each category. There is a singificant difference of price impact between "good news" and "bad news" event. For good announcements, the market seems to react slowly before the announcement, react instantly to the release of the betterthan-expected EPS information on day 0 with an average abnormal return of 0.71%, followed by 0.18% on day 1 and then negligible daily abnormal returns for the rest of the window.
However, following bad announcements it appears to take up to 5 days on average before the share price levels out and fully incorporates the worse-than-expected results. This is consistent with the findings of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
CAR and legislative change
To investigate the effect of two legislative changes, we split our sample into three cate- came into force. A CAR −1 of 0.61%, statistically significant at the 5% level, for the 7 days prior to a "good news" announcement indicates that there was significant abnormal trading during the period Jan 1998 -December 2002 and as such, the recognition of the need to improve the insider trading regime was well founded. Figure 2 plots the CAR t of good news and bad news categories during the pre-legislative change period. The findings are similar to those in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 Table 5 ). This is evidence that the move to a public enforcement agency and increasing the disclosure requirements from the SMAA 2002 significantly reduced the presence of abnormal trading activity in the New Zealand market, and is consistent with the findings of Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) . Similar findings could be also drawed from Figure 3 , which plots the CAR t of good news and bad news categories during the post-first and pre-second legislative change period.
[Insert Table 5 Table 6 ). For the post-SMAA 2006 period (2008-2014), we find a CAR −1 for the 7 days prior to announcement of 0.88%, significant at the 1% level, over four times higher than prior to the change, and 50% higher than before the first legislative change, reversing the good effects of the SMAA 2002. Among the AR results, AR −6 is highly significant, and is the driving factor of the significance of CAR. This is also much earlier than those during the first period (before legislative change) and the second period The government is, however, likely to be averse to reversing the change. From a political standpoint, public opinion is still very much focused on the financial markets, and the government does not want to be seen as going easy on those manipulating the market by reducing the punishment for engaging in insider trading activity. The first case that is successfully prosecuted by the FMA may set a precedent and provide credibility to the threat of criminal prosecution, increasing the risk of engaging in insider trading activity.
[Insert Table 6 here]
[Insert Figure 4 here]
VPIN results
In order to test whether there is a change of informed trading before earnings announcements, we calculate the daily VPIN for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 1 day before. Table 7 reports the VPIN results during two time windows, [-7,
-5] and [-4, -1] . Similarly, we only report the results of "bad news" and "good news" group.
The first panel reports the results of full sample. There is an increase of informed trading during [-4, -1] compared with [-7, -5] for both groups. The increase of "bad news" group is significant at 10% level, while the increase of "good news" group is significant at 1% level.
This is consistent with the positive CAR returns during this period for the full sample in Table 2 , especially for the "good news" group. This suggests that there exists not only significant positive CAR returns , but also signfifcant increase of informed trading before earnings announcements.
Moving to the results of three sub-periods, we find that the change of informed trading is not significant during the first period, which is partly due to the small sample size. The change of informed trading for the "bad news" group is not significant in any periods, suggesting there is no significant change of informed trading before the earnings annoucements for those companies. This is consistent with the results of CAR analysis. The change of informed trading for the "good news" category is significant at 10% level during the period 2 but is signifciant at 5% during the period 3. This again shows that after the second legislative change, the informed trading increases more significantly before earnings annoucements. This is also consistent with the CAR results. In all, the VPIN results suggest that there exists an significant increase of informed trading before earnings annoucements in New Zealand stock market. The second legislative change is not as effective in reducing such informed trading as the first legislative change.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Extended test
Besides the change of abnormal trading under different legilsative change, it is also interesting to examine the relationship between firm characteristic and abnormal trading. For example, what kinds of firms tend to have more significant abnormal trading? In order to address this question, we use relative bid-ask spread and market capitalization to sort the firms into five groups and examine the CAR of "bad news" and "good news" for each group.
The relative bid-ask spread is calculated as
, where Ask t and Bid t are the ask and bid price of the stock in day t. High bid-ask spread or small size group represent low liquidity stocks while low bid-ask spread or large size group represent high liquidity stocks. Literature shows that abnormal returns surrounding price sensitive announcements are higher for small firms (Ball and Kothari, 1991) , and illiquid firms are more vulnerable to insider trading (Easley et al., 1996; Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 1997) .
The first two panels of Table 8 reports the CAR results. For simplicity, we only report the results of low and high bid-ask spread group for bid-ask spread variable, and the results of small and large group for market capitalization variable. We only report the results of CAR −1 , i.e., the cumulative abnormal returns beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 1 day before. For the "good news" event, the CAR of high bid-ask spread portfolio or small portfolio is higher than that of low bid-ask spread portfolio or large portfolio. This suggests that less liquid stocks tend to have more signficiant CAR. The impact of abnormal trading on the less liquid stocks is more significant.
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We then examine the CAR across different industries. We categorize each stock based on its NZX industry classification. The last Panel of Table 8 reports the results. The Finance, Consumer, Investment and, in particular, Goods industries all display average cumulative abnormal returns prior to the earnings announcements much higher than the full sample average, with all values statistically significant at at least the 5% level. The Goods industry stands out with an average price-run up of 1.22% prior to "good news" announcements. The average company in the Goods industry has a market capitalisation in the smaller end of our sample, however it is unlikely this fully explains the big difference in the CAR observed.
Apart from company sizes, some (non-exhaustive) reasons for the cross-industry variations could be differing company structures, quality of corporate governance, company cultures and policies, or regulatory environments. This could provide an interesting opportunity for future research.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Conclusion
Using an event study methodology, we investigate the price run-ups prior to earnings announcements in the New Zealand market from January 1998 -March 2014. We found statistically significant evidence that abnormal trading activity occurred prior to announcements that are considered "good news" through the existence of pre-announcement price run ups. The trading appears to be more prevalent in less liquid firms and within some industries.
7 The appendix reports the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for companies on the NZX All index for these groups.
Following on from this analysis, we examine the effect of two legislative changes which occurred during the period and aimed to reduce insider trading in New Zealand. The first change created a public watchdog and increased disclosure requirements, and appears to have had some success in decreasing insider trading activity. The introduction of criminal sanctions on insider trading through the second legislative change appears to have had a detrimental effect. The increased burden of proof on prosecutors results in a decreased chance of being prosecuted for insider trading, which was already low to begin with. Our findings provide important insights into the effectiveness of different regulatory strategies, particularly the use of criminal sanctions. We also use the VPIN to examine the change of informed trading before the earnings announcements, and obtain similar results.
There are several questions that are worthwhile for future research in New Zealand. We find that the abnormal trading only happens within some industries. It is an interesting question to find the reasons. Further research could be done to link the coporate governance efficiency with the abnormal trading. For example, the companies with better governance structure have better control of information leakage and are possibly less subject to abnormal trading. More direct evidence of insider trading could be tested by investigating the individual account data and find out the source of abnormal trading behavior. This table reports average abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period January 1998 -March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the market model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. S.D. is the standard deviation of the CAR t . * , * * and * * * denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
Event day
Bad news Good news This table reports abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period January 1998 -1 December 2002 (i.e. before the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 came into force). The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the market model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. S.D. is the standard deviation of the CAR t . * , * * and * * * denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Bad news Good news The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the Market Model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. S.D. is the standard deviation of the CAR t . * , * * and * * * denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Bad news Good news This table reports abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period March 2008 -March 2014 (i.e. after the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 came into force). The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the Market Model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. S.D. is the standard deviation of the CAR t . * , * * and * * * denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Bad news Good news This table reports the volume-synchronized probability of informed trading measure (VPIN) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 1 day before. The mean and standard deviation of daily VPIN during the two time window [-7, -5] and [-4, -1] are reported. Obs. is the number of observations. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Difference is the difference of mean VPIN between time window [-7, -5] and [-4, - This graph plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period January 1998 -March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. This graph plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period January 1998 -1 December 2002. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. This graph plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the 111 companies on the NZX All index during the period March 2008-March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. This table reports average abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for companies in the bottom quintile of average bid-ask spread percentage during the period January 1998 -March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the market model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. S.D. is the standard deviation of the CAR t .
* , * * and * * * denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table reports abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the smallest 20% of companies on the NZX All index, based on market capitalisation, during the period January 1998 -March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the market model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. This table reports abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the period beginning 7 days before the announcement and ending 7 days after for the largest 20% of companies on the NZX All index, based on market capitalisation, during the period January 1998 -March 2014. The announcements are categorised into "good news" and "bad news", based on the change in their announced earnings per share from their last announcement, adjusted for the market average change. Event day is days relative to the announcement. Obs. is the number of observations for each day. AR t is the sample average abnormal return for day t calculated using the market model. CAR t is the sample average cumulative abnormal return from event day -7 to t. 
